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I. TRODUCTION
"The respondent in this case killed a 10-year-old child."' So states the
first sentence of Justice White's dissent in Brewer v. Williams. White
approached Brewer from the factual premise that a heinous crime had been
committed, while the majority framed the case conceptually, as presenting a
"right to counsel" issue. It is this distinction between fact and concept, between
underlying transaction and doctrine, that provides critical insight into the
jurisprudence of Justice Byron White. White's philosophy cannot be pinned to
a single point on any jurisprudential spectrum: conservative to liberal, activist
to strict constructionist, interpretivist to noninterpretivist. Nor do such terms
as moderate, centrist, or swing vote adequately describe his role on the
Supreme Court. Yet, White's jurisprudence is not as unpredictable nor as
enigmatic as commentators have suggested.2 His critics' frustration may arise
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from an assumption that the formality of law predominates over the
transactions that give rise to legal controversies. Not too surprisingly, a
jurisprudence that proceeds upon a different assumption may well appear
unpredictable or enigmatic within the formal structure. But from a slightly
different perspective-from the perspective of legal realism-such a
transaction-oriented jurisprudence may appear more coherent.
Of course, I realize that by using the term "legal realism," I am entering
a definitional thicket from which there may be no completely satisfactory exit.
Exactly who the realists were as well as the specific content of their school of
thought remains a matter of continuing debate.3 I use the term to capture some
of the salient elements that are generally recognized as part of the realist
tradition. First, legal doctrine should arise from a clear understanding of how
society actually functions. In other words, facts should precede doctrine, and
not the converse. Second, lawyers and judges are not necessarily the best fact
finders. In fact, to some extent lawyers and judges should be mistrusted as
both self-interested and idiosyncratic. Third, and perhaps somewhat
incongruously, experts in social science and empirical research will provide the
necessary insights into how society functions. And finally, the evolutionary
state of society and social institutions requires a government structure that can
adapt to changing circumstances.4 As such, my definition of legal realism also
includes the underlying reformist attitude espoused by some traditional legal
realists, of both the Progressive and the New Deal varieties.5
Just as the quotation from Brewer v. Williams elevates hard fact over legal
concept, this Essay attempts to elevate what Justice White actually did (or
attempted to do) over how a more formalist approach might define or
categorize the various points in his career. Although the Essay often
concentrates on selected doctrinal areas, the purpose is not to catalog doctrine
but to examine Justice White's thinking about our political system and the
Man on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 16; Jeffrey Rosen, The Next
Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 1993, at 21.
3. The supposed realists were never quite sure themselves. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT 73-83 (1973); see also JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-
1970: A HISTORY 147-227 (1990); John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 459 (1979). See generally Roscoe Pound, The Scope
and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911);
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe
Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
4. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); HERGET, supra note 3, at 194-227; LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 3-44 (1986); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH (1930); TWINING, supra note 3, at 79 (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE, 55-57 (1962)); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and
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judiciary's role within that system.6 This reversal of priorities will provide
insight into White's performance as a Justice as well as encourage an
appreciation for the perspective from which that performance emanated, a
perspective that was influenced by the aura of legal realism and policy science
that pervaded Yale Law School while White was a student there.7
Speaking more generally, the Essay attempts to show that formal
distinctions between doctrines are not, ultimately, distinctions of substance, but
of organizational convenience. For example, the separation of powers and the
protection of fundamental rights are merely different aspects of the same basic
problem regarding the nature and function of our political system. Yet our lack
of intellectual dexterity relegates us to draw boundaries that facilitate
discussion. At some point, however, the artificiality of these boundaries ought
to become apparent. In the end, doctrines are nothing more than different
perspectives from which to consider the same basic themes and questions.
II. DIFFusION OF POWER AND THE AGENDA OF A MODERN GOVERNMENT
Our government is formally structured into three branches created by the
text of the Constitution and described with neat precision in basic civics books.
But as soon as one looks at this system in action, the formal structure begins
to dissolve. The constitutional system of checks and balances, including the
power of judicial review, ensures that although the branches are technically
separate, the separation is never complete. Practicalities of governing further
dilute the purity of formal lines. Justice Robert Jackson described this
intermingled separation:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
power into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
8
6. Given the broad range of issues Justice White considered during his 31 years on the Court, this
Essay cannot possibly provide a detailed explication of his judicial career. Thus, many important subjects
such as criminal procedure, jurisdiction, and affirmative action will not be discussed. My selection of which
cases and topics to discuss was not, however, based on a desire to construct a particular vision of Justice
White's jurisprudence, but upon a judgment that the selected materials reflected White's basic judicial
attitude. A more detailed and less impressionistic explication of Justice White's judicial career is obviously
in order.
7. KALMAN, supra note 4, at 176-87.
8. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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This same pragmatic concern-creating a "workable government"-
preoccupied the legal realists.
Early legal realists sought to discover and understand how law and legal
institutions functioned within society.9 But functionalism was not merely a
tool of discovery; the function of law was thought to be the proper determinant
of doctrine. t Justice White's decisions often employed this functionalist
analysis. Two of his opinions (both dissents) involving the separation of
powers illustrate functionalism and reflect yet another realist theme: the
propriety of permitting government to exercise a wide range of flexibility in
its quest to resolve complex social problems. While demonstrating both the
elegance and utility of functionalism, the opinions expose its shortcomings as
well.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. involved
the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978." At issue was a
provision of the Act that authorized the newly created Article I bankruptcy
courts to adjudicate state-law claims. Since bankruptcy judges were not Article
III judges, the question was whether this conferral of authority violated the
principles of Article ImI.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion held that Congress may not
constitutionally confer Article IIl adjudicatory power upon institutions that do
not meet the conditions set forth in Article III, namely, life tenure and salary
independence. Brennan derived his conclusion from the "abstract principle"'2
of an independent judiciary.' 3 That is, the opinion first developed the concept,
defined independently from the controversy, and then applied the abstraction
to the facts. In its conceptual analysis, the plurality did recognize three
historical exceptions to the prescriptions of Article III-territorial courts,
courts-martial, and courts adjudicating public rights. The bankruptcy courts,
9. KALMAN, supra note 4, at 3-44; see also TWINING, supra note 3, at 74 (providing qualified
definition of legal realism and functionalism: "A realist is one who, no matter what his ideological or
philosophical views, believes that it is important regularly to focus attention on the law in action at any
given time and try to describe as honestly and clearly as possible what is to be seen." (emphasis added)).
10. In three of his nine "points of departure" common to the realist movement, Karl Llewellyn
characterized the functionalist component as follows:
(2) The conception of law as a means to social ends and not as an end in itself; so that any part
needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the light
of both and of their relation to each other.
(3) The conception of society in flux, and in flux typically faster than the law, so that the
probability is always given that any portion of law needs reexamination to determine how far
it fits the society it purports to serve....
(8) An insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects, and an insistence on
the worthwhileness of trying to find these effects.
KARL LLEWELLYN, Some Realism About Realism, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
42, 55-57 (1962).
11. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
12. Id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 57-60.
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however, fell into none of these carefully defined, and hence formal,
categories. 4
Justice White began his dissent with a mock concession: the language of
Article III could "easily" be interpreted to require that any court established
by Congress meet the conditions set forth in Article Mn."5 Such a reading
would be "eminently sensible" and "well founded in both the documentary
sources and the political doctrine of separation of powers that stands behind
much of our constitutional structure."' 6 But such an approach would be a
"gross oversimplification" and "superficial.' 17 For White, the Article I
doctrine could not be adequately derived from "unsupportable abstractions,
divorced from the realities of modem practice."' Rather, a proper analysis
must consider the historical and contemporary "functions"'19 of the bankruptcy
courts and Article I.
White chastised the plurality for its unrealistic appraisal of pre- and post-
Act bankruptcy courts. While the plurality viewed the conferral of jurisdiction
over state-created claims as novel, White argued that bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over state-law claims was a common and well-accepted practice
prior to the 1978 Act; the new law merely changed the scope of that
jurisdiction from in rem to in personam.20 He wrote: "One need not
contemplate the intricacies of the separation-of-powers doctrine ... to realize
that the majority's position on adjudication of state-law claims is based on an
abstract theory that has little to do with the reality of bankruptcy
proceedings."'" For White, one must begin with the operational facts. Here
that required an appreciation of how bankruptcy courts actually functioned both
before and after the adoption of the Act.
On a more general level, White viewed the Court's Article III doctrinal
model as out-of-sync with history, precedent, and modem practice. He
regarded the three exceptions (territorial courts, courts-martial, and courts
adjudicating public rights) not simply as legalistic categories to be construed
strictly against a formidable wall of Article III jurisprudence, but as examples
of how government structure had developed and changed.
There is no difference in principle between the work that Congress
may assign to an Art. I court and that which the Constitution assigns
to Art. III courts. Unless we want to overrule a large number of our
precedents upholding a variety of Art. I courts-not to speak of those
14. Id. at 64-72. The plurality also heid that the bankruptcy courts could not be fairly construed as
adjuncts to the district court. Id. at 76-87.
15. Id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 101.
19. Id. at 99, 102, 103.
20. Id. at 95-100.
21. Id. at 98.
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Art. I courts that go by the contemporary name of "administrative
agencies"-this conclusion is inevitable. It is too late to go back that
far; too late to return to the simplicity of the principle pronounced in
Art. I and defended so vi orously and persuasively by Hamilton in
The Federalist Nos. 78-82.
2
The basic principles of Article I did play a part in his analysis, but only
as a relatively fluid check upon the evolving structure of government: "Article
1II is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as
expressing one value that must be balanced against competing constitutional
values and legislative responsibilities. This Court retains the final word on how
that balance is to be struck."3 In assessing that balance, the key question is
the extent to which the legislative scheme undermines the fundamental role of
Article III courts, a role which White described as "a firm check on the ability
of the political institutions of government to ignore or transgress constitutional
limits on their own authority."'24 As applied to the Bankruptcy Act, White
found neither an aggrandizement of power nor, considering the provision of
Article III appellate review, any threat to the essential Article III function of
judicial review725
A functional approach to separation of powers is also evident in Justice
White's dissent in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.26 In
that case, the Court held that a one-House legislative veto violated the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment. The majority undertook a
textual exegesis similar to that of the Northern Pipeline plurality. The Court
assumed that the words of the Constitution possess a vitality independent of
the transaction that gave rise to the controversy. Again, the analysis began with
a fully formed doctrine: the language of the Constitution requires that all new
laws satisfy the requirements of bicameralism and presentment. Since, in the
Court's view, a legislative veto alters the status quo and is therefore
tantamount to a new law, a legislative veto must satisfy those requirements.
The transaction must conform to the preset doctrine.27
22. Id. at 113.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 115.
25. Id. at 116-18. In Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), Justice White, writing for the
Court, upheld the authority of Congress to create legislative courts for the adjudication of crimes committed
within the District of Columbia. He observed:
[B]oth Congress and this Court have recognized... that the requirements of Art. III, which are
applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must
in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to
legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive
treatment.
Id. at 407-08.
26. 462 U.S. 919, 967-1013 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
27. See id. at 956-58.
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According to White, the Chadha Court's exposition of the Bicameralism
and Presentment Clauses was both "truismatic" and irrelevant." The
legislative veto, a device unknown to the Framers, was not the same as new
legislation and, as a consequence, need not be subjected to the rules
specifically designed for such legislation. Rather, the question was whether
Congress could reasonably conclude that the legislative veto was an
appropriate legislative tool in the modem administrative state. For White, the
constitutional analysis began with an understanding of how the underlying
transaction-the legislative veto-functioned within the real-world structure of
government. The legislative veto
is an important if not indispensable political invention that allows the
President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and policy
differences, assures the accountability of independent regulatory
agencies, and preserves Congress' control over lawmaking....
The history of the legislative veto also makes clear that it has not
been a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself
at the expense of the other branches-the concerns of Madison and
Hamilton. Rather, the veto has been a means of defense, a reservation
of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated
role under Art. I as the Nation's lawmaker.29
Given the Court's approval of the modem administrative state, White found the
Court's disapproval of the legislative veto inexplicable. "If the effective
functioning of a complex modem government requires the delegation of vast
authority which, by virtue of its breadth, is legislative or 'quasi-legislative' in
character, I cannot accept that Art. I... should forbid Congress to qualify that
grant with a legislative veto.,
30
As in Northern Pipeline, White criticized the majority's rigid construction
of separation-of-powers doctrine.3' White offered instead a more
"accomodat[ing] and practical[]" framework:
[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between
the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to
which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is
justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress."
28. Id. at 979-80 (White, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 972-74.
30. Id. at 989 (emphasis added); see also id. at 986 ("There is no question but that agency rulemaking
is lawmaking in any functional or realistic sense of the word.") (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 998-1000.
32. Id. at 1000 (quoting Nixon v. Admin'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
1993]
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According to White, nothing in the circumstances of Chadha-the exercise of
a legislative veto in the context of a suspension of deportation-suggested any
diminution of the executive's ability to carry out any constitutionally mandated
function.33 As a consequence, the legislative veto was constitutional.
Despite the intellectual appeal of White's Chadha dissent, there is a
nagging sense that something is not quite right. White's appraisal of legislative
vetoes was itself somewhat formalistic, resting more on a theoretical, rather
than an empirical, application of the functional technique; the opinion assumed
that legislative vetoes operate both to assist the administrative state and to
protect the values inherent in the separation of powers. In particular, White
assumed that legislative vetoes actually operate to control administrative
discretion.34 Moreover, confronting the facts of Chadha, White ignored the
somewhat seedy operation of legislative vetoes in the context of deportation,
while Chief Justice Burger recognized those facts.35 A closer look at
legislative vetoes in action, including a more exacting examination of the facts
before the Court, may have led to a slightly different "functional" appraisal.36
Perhaps White's faith in the administrative state deterred him from taking
functionalism to its next logical step.
Overall, the Northern Pipeline and Chadha dissents present a general
picture of White's attitude toward the separation of powers.37 Quite clearly,
Justice White did not view the political structure as static or completely bound
by constitutional text.38 The government model described and defended by the
Framers did not, in White's view, fully capture all possibilities of legitimate
government; rather the Framer's model demonstrated how certain principles
functioned in eighteenth-century government. Those principles remain the
foundation of modem constitutional law. But today's political structure does
not and need not conform to any precise formulation beyond the preservation
of those core principles. As such, White's approach to separation of powers
33. Id.
34. Indeed, his treatment of this point was relegated to a footnote that recognized the existence of a
substantial debate on the issue. See id. at 976 n.12.
35. Id. at 923-28.
36. For a functional analysis of legislative vetoes, see Brian C. Murchison, The Concept of
Independence in Public Law, 41 EMoRY L.J. 961, 1005-08 (1992) and Peter C. Strauss, Was There a Baby
in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE L. 789,
804-12.
37. See also Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Ill
S. Ct. 2298, 2317 n.3 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting "hollow ring" of claim to legislative tyranny
when one considers actual allocations of authority between Congress and Executive); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714,759-76 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (challenging Court's "formalistic" rejection of Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973)
(White, J.) (upholding authority of Congress to create legislative courts for adjudication of crimes
committed within District of Columbia).
38. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 94 (White, J., dissenting) ("Whether fortunate or
unfortunate, at this point in the history of constitutional law [the scope of Art. III limits] can no longer be
answered by looking only to the constitutional text.").
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conforms with the legal realist tenet that law ought to reflect the reality of
changing social conditions.
Within this evolving structure, the judiciary's role should be one of studied
deference. The underlying assumptions are that each political branch is in the
best position to protect its own prerogatives, and that this internal tension will
protect the liberty of the people. The judicial role is not, however, completely
passive. In White's view, the Court retains "the final word" on the
constitutionality of any political adjustment of the separation of powers.39 In
rendering its decision, the Court should examine the extent to which the
legislative scheme undermines or accommodates the separation-of-powers
values at stake; any perceived burdens upon the separation of powers should
be balanced against the values Congress hopes to promote.40 In practice, this
means a functional approach. In Northern Pipeline, for example, White's
willingness to uphold the congressional scheme was based upon "ample
provision.., for appellate review by Art. ImI courts."'" As such, "the critical
function of judicial review" had not been displaced by the Article I bankruptcy
courts.4 2 Similarly, in Chadha White stated, "I do not suggest that all
legislative vetoes are necessarily consistent with separation-of-powers
principles. A legislative check on an inherently executive function, for
example, that of initiating prosecutions, poses an entirely different
question. '43  These limits demonstrate how core separation-of-powers
principles require that certain functions remain in the designated branch.'
This notion of fluid separation has a certain, elegant attraction,45 for
surely any account of separation of powers ought to consider the manner in
39. 458 U.S. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 115.
41. Id. at 116.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting). But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(White joins majority opinion upholding independent counsel provisions of Ethics in Government Act of
1978).
44. Justice White applied this functional analysis in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Buckley, unlike in Northern Pipeline and Chadha, the
functional analysis demonstrated that the legislative scheme was unconstitutional because it undermined
core separation-of-powers values. In Buckley, which involved a multifaceted challenge to the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, White agreed with the Court's conclusion that the selection
process for the Federal Election Commission violated the Appointments Clause. Under the Amendments,
FEC members were not appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause; yet in Justice White's reckoning
the members of the FEC were "officers of the United States" within the meaning of that clause-their
duties and functions included a vast array of enforcement activities. Although White considered the law's
purposes important, he was unwilling to sanction any exceptions to the strictures of the Appointments
Clause. White believed that the executive's appointment power was of critical importance to the separation
of powers. Id. at 271-75. The Buckley opinion, like the dissents in Northern Pipeline and Chadha,
recognized the legitimacy of the administrative state and accepted the changing face of the separation of
powers, but deemed the structural imperatives of the Appointments Clause too critical to ignore. See also
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 765 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (accepting proposition that Congress
may not reserve executive role for itself or its agents).
45. Even the Framers, who were at least in part pragmatists, did not envision anything like a strict
separation of powers. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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which government actually operates. However, any attempt to make
constitutional doctrine fit a judge's perception of functional reality encounters
several problems. Applying functionalism, the tripartite model can be
excessively fractionalized, with power dispersed in peculiar and even counter-
intuitive ways. For example, a legislative veto over agency rulemaking inverts
the constitutionally established lawmaking responsibilities where Congress
initiates new laws and the executive acts as a check. Similarly, Article I judges
deciding Article III matters can be seen as dispersing Article III authority, or
as preserving core Article I functions by retaining appellate review. Thus
relying on functionalism to determine when a constitutional value or principle
is threatened may lead to varying conclusions and, potentially, to a pattern of
seemingly incoherent results. One needs faith in the competing institutions of
government and in the self-restraint imposed out of fear of judicial intervention
to subscribe to this evolutionary conception of the separation of powers. Of
course, if one accepts that constitutional change occurs when new social
phenomena make dogma obsolete, then regardless of trepidation, judges must
make this leap of faith as an unavoidable acknowledgement of how
governments actually operate. Certainly, this was Justice White's view.
Justice White's functional analysis descends directly from the
functionalism promoted by the first generation of legal realists. 6 For both
White and the early realists, the perceived manner in which the law operated
was of critical importance. To this end, facts, and not concepts, were of the
essence. The law should be constructed around the relevant facts; the reality
behind the law ought to be the reality of the law. However, as the brief
critique of Chadha suggests, the choice of which facts comprise reality is of
no minor significance. The choice of facts may be less an objective measure
of reality than a value judgment about the proper result.
Of course, the realists' attraction to functionalism represented more than
a fascination with technique; realists viewed functionalism as an antidote for
the arid formalism of the late nineteenth century, a formalism which rested
upon the delusion that law was more appropriately understood as a taxonomy
of axiomatic concepts and doctrines. In a similar fashion, White's separation-
of-powers dissents reject that taxonomical approach to law. Doctrine was not
irrelevant to White; rather, he considered doctrine as one of the facts to
contend with in the ongoing creation of government.
One should begin to sense that rejecting formalism is not without its costs.
Despite the sophisticated appeal of a functional appraisal of government
structure, a constitutional doctrine molded to match one's vision of reality may
impart its own sense of aridity by inviting the eventual evaporation of
normative principles.
46. See generally KALMAN, supra note 4, at 3-44.
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Finally, legal realism was more than a rejection of formalism; it also
promoted the reformist traditions of the Progressive movement and the New
Deal's radical spin on progressivism.47 If one assumes, as the Progressives
and New Dealers did, that government should operate as a positive, regulatory
force in society, then the institutions of government must be structured to
permit government to respond effectively to society's needs. A rigid structure
may inhibit responsiveness, whereas a less formal structure would provide the
government greater leeway in designing appropriate cures for social ills.
White's separation-of-powers dissents reflect this progressive attitude; they
promote a "modem government [able to] address a formidable agenda of
complex policy issues, ' 4 and adopt a functional analysis that permits the
realization of that goal. The underlying assumption, of course, is that the goal
of a progressive and activist government is a good thing.
III. THE TRIUMPH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
In his dissent in Bowsher v. Synar, Justice White referred to the "advent
and triumph of the administrative state.' 49 These strong words indicate
something more than acquiescence in the status quo. Indeed, for White, the
administrative state was the primary feature of the new, evolving separation of
powers, a fourth branch of government composed of experts charged with the
federal supervision of our economy and our society.50 The seeds of White's
confidence in the administrative state may well have been sown during his
student days at Yale Law School where members of the faculty extolled the
virtues and even the necessity of expert involvement in the formation of law
and policy." That confidence remained unshaken throughout White's judicial
career.
52
47. See HERGEr, supra note 3, at 164-70; Schlegel, supra note 3; G. Edward White, From
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century
America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
48. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999.
49. 478 U.S. 714, 761 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
50. See Byron R. White, The State of the Law: The Bar's Responsibility, 17 GONZ. L. REv. 849, 853-
54 (1982). See generally Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421
(1987).
51. See, e.g., RODELL, supra note 5, at 263-68; Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 4.
52. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 850-51 (1992) (White, J., dissenting); Dole v.
United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43-55 (1990) (White, J., dissenting); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,
541-42 (1990) (White, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Electrical Workers, 481 U.S. 573, 598-603 (1987) (White,
J., dissenting); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (White, J.); Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (White, J.); Public Serv. Comm'n
v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319, 343-53 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Serv,, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982) (White, J.); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571,585-95 (1981)
(White, J., dissenting); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (White, J.); Detroit
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 320-21 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); American Broadcasting Co. v.
Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411 (1978) (White, J.); NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978) (White, J.);
NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) (White, J.); Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 813-14 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
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Not too surprisingly, White's vision of the administrative state parallels his
functional appraisal of the separation of powers. The pragmatic operation of
the administrative state initially determines the scope of doctrine. Because an
administrative state requires that experts resolve complex problems, legal
doctrine must grant these experts the discretion necessary to accomplish their
mission. Thus the necessity of expert judgment, and its function within the
framework of shared power, defines the scope of the applicable separation-of-
powers doctrine and compels a doctrine of broad delegation and judicial
deference.53 Contrariwise, if one had started with a rigid concept of separation
of powers-strict rules of nondelegation-the administrative state would have
been stillborn.
Functionalism, although permitting delegation and deference, does entail
judicial oversight.54 As with the separation of powers, the judiciary
determines whether the legislative or administrative scheme impinges upon
core constitutional principles. Government must be structured to avoid the
aggrandizement of power and the exercise of arbitrary authority. Alterations
of the basic tripartite model are acceptable-including limitations on the scope
of judicial review-as long as core principles remain in place.
Justice White demonstrated how the judiciary should check administrative
agencies in his opinion for the Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers v. State
Farm.55 In that case, the Court struck down an agency's attempt to rescind
a regulation that would have required that manufacturers equip automobiles
with airbags or automatic seatbelts. White's opinion presented a fact-intensive
examination of the record that revealed the agency's failure to fully examine
and appreciate the relevant data.56 While illustrating judicial oversight, the
State Farm opinion also reflects, somewhat counter-intuitively, White's
penchant for allowing administrative agencies broad latitude in judgment. For
although the State Farm Court reversed the agency's attempted rescission, the
Court provided the agency with the broadest possible discretion on remand.
The agency could require the use of airbags, the use of automatic seatbelts,
both, or neither, so long as the final decision was rational.57 In general, so
270, 281-82 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 288-
300 (1966) (White, J., dissenting); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 294 (1965) (White, J., dissenting).
53. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972).
54. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1405-07
(1992) (White, J., dissenting); DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568 (1988) (White, J.); ESTI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988) (White, J.); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (White, J.); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397-
418 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 432-37 (1977) (White, J., dissenting);
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 80-89 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
55. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
56. Id. at 51, 56.
57. Id. at 51, 56.
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long as administrative agencies act within a broadly defined area of reason and
facts, White would respect their expert determinations.
Justice White's "realistic" endorsement of the administrative state raises
some philosophical concerns. Legal realism's belief that formalist doctrinal law
often masks arbitrary power by lawyers, judges, and politicians collides head-
on with legal realism's asserted faith in the experts' ability to discover the true
facts underlying social relationships and to devise appropriate remedies for a
vast array of social ills. Advancing administrative law as a solution to social
problems assumes that experts (and those interested in insulating expert
judgment from the democratic process) will not fabricate doctrinal masks for
the exercise of their own arbitrary power. Whether this faith is warranted is,
at the very least, open to question. 9 It may even be dangerous.
Yet Justice White's jurisprudence is more subtle than hard-line realism.60
For instance, his opinions in Chadha and State Farm recognize the need to
check, both legislatively and judicially, the exercise of administrative power.
His willingness to probe the decisions of individual agencies or administrators,
however, was not accompanied by an equivalent willingness to question his
general endorsement of the administrative state. Rather, he simply accepted the
administrative state as a new and triumphant appendage to constitutional
structure. It was "too late" to do otherwise. Yet a functional appraisal of the
administrative state may have revealed that expert judgment can neither
adequately assess the scope of social ills nor devise effective responses to
those ills. It may have shown that centrally-planned solutions are not superior
to market solutions.61
While it is not the judiciary's role to devise the country's economic theory,
one would hope that judges would at least consider economic and social
consequences before endorsing a massive alteration of constitutional structure.
It may well be that despite the appeal of scientific thinking, our ability, even
through experts, to appreciate and account for the complex dynamics that
operate within the social structure is simply inadequate to the task of
centralized planning. Seemingly rational planners may in fact adopt irrational
58. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (White, J.) (applying and
enforcing rational basis standard under Fourteenth Amendment); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that school financing scheme is
irrational and violates equal protection clause).
59. Fred Rodell's Woe Unto You, Lawyers!, which disparages the law as hocus pocus while extolling
the virtues of expert judgment, presents an unintended expression of this incongruity. RODELL, supra note
5, at 249-74.
60. Among other things, Justice White did not share the rather bleak view of lawyers espoused by
some realists. See Byron R. White, Challenges for the U.S. Supreme Court and the Bar: Contemporary
Reflections, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 275, 276 (1982); White, supra note 50, at 867 (1982).
61. Friedrich Hayek suggests, in powerful terms, both the unworkability of a general model of
centralized planning and the incipient threat to liberty and the rule of law posed by an undue reliance upon
that model. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 56-100 (1944) [hereinafter, HAYEK, THE ROAD
TO SERFDOM]; see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 263 (1960); FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 263-65 (1967).
1993]
The Yale Law Journal
plans that nonetheless satisfy the doctrinal patina of the "hard look." If this
less confident view of experts is correct, if it is the "reality" of the human
condition, one would expect a less deferential doctrine of administrative
law.
62
Similarly, judicial acquiescence in the administrative state has precluded
a tough constitutional examination of the conflict between the practice of
centralized planning and the concept of individual liberty. While centralized
planning is premised upon the notion that experts know best, individual liberty
is premised upon the notion that individual choice in a competitive market
provides not only the best economic solutions, but the optimum circumstances
for human fulfillment and social development. The Court, including Justice
White, has never confronted this conflict; instead it has acquiesced in an
alteration of constitutional structure that may run counter to the liberal,
individualistic premise of our constitutional system. Planning, regardless of its
specific nature and consequences, is treated as a benign, unidimensional
concept, subject only to a deferential judicial oversight. Assuming, as I do, that
the truth involves a complicated accommodation of the extremes of central
planning and absolute free choice, this limited judicial response may merit
reconsideration as we move from the era of the New Deal and into the twenty-
first century.
63
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITHIN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE
Constitutional law is sometimes thought of as raising two distinct types of
issues, those involving the structure of government and those involving specific
limitations on the exercise of otherwise legitimate power. The former typically
addresses questions of separation of powers or federalism, the latter often
concerns personal liberty. Naturally, the two types of issues-structure and
limitation-intertwine: the form and function of government largely determines
the scope of liberty interests, and a liberty interest cannot be defined
adequately without commenting upon the government's form and function.
Justice White's First Amendment opinions often reflect this
interrelationship of structure and limitation. Indeed, his analysis of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press carries the same functionalist tone evidenced
in his separation-of-powers and administrative law analysis.' However, while
White's administrative law jurisprudence often runs counter to basic concepts
of classic liberalism such as individual choice, his First Amendment decisions,
premised on a similar application of functionalism, quite often embody and
promote those very same concepts.
62. Again, White's opinions in Chadha and State Farm do run contrary to the easy faith in
administrative action, but those opinions go to the details and not the premises of the administrative state.
63. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 446-52, 463-79.
64. See discussion supra parts IT, III.
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White's dissent in Buckley v. Valeo65 is illustrative. In Buckley, the Court
addressed a wide array of constitutional challenges to the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. For present purposes, it is sufficient to
note that the Court upheld the Amendment's limitations on contributions to
candidates for federal office, but struck down the related expenditure
limitations-independent expenditures, personal expenditures, and total
expenditures-as inconsistent with the First Amendment. In arriving at the
latter holding, the Court reasoned that limitations on expenditures were not
justifiable because these limitations posed little potential for reducing electoral
corruption, but greatly infringed on the First Amendment.66
Justice White dissented from this aspect of Court's holding. In sum, White
weighed the structural concerns of preventing corruption, minimizing electoral
costs, and promoting equity in the electoral system, against the limitations on
political discourse and found expenditure limits constitutional.
His opinion begins with a strong affirmation of what he characterized as
the "undoubted" power of Congress to prevent the corruption of the federal
electoral process.67 Not surprisingly, White's instinct was to defer to the
congressional judgment, not simply or even primarily because of Congress'
role as the nation's lawmaker, but because of what White perceived as the
practical, real-world experience that animated the passage of the Amendments:
Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also have
corruptive potential; but the Court strikes down the provision,
strangely enough claiming more insight as to what may improperly
influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress
that passed this bill and the President who signed it. Those supporting
the bill undeniably included many seasoned professionals who have
been deeply involved in elective processes and who have viewed them
at close range over many years. 8
This pragmatic perspective, bolstered by a hard-edged tone, stays close to the
surface throughout the dissent. As to the legitimacy of the ceiling on total
campaign expenditures, White observed:
I have little doubt ... that limiting the total that can be spent will
ease the candidate's understandable obsession with fundraising, and
so free him and his staff to communicate in. more places and ways
unconnected with the fundraising function. There is nothing
objectionable-indeed it seems to me a weighty interest in favor of
the provision-in the attempt to insulate the political expression of
federal candidates from the influence inevitably exerted by the endless
65. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
66. Id. at 47-48.
67. Id. at 257-58 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 261.
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job of raising increasingly large sums of money. I regret that the
Court has returned them all to the treadmill.69
As this quotation suggests, for White, the First Amendment does not operate
merely as a doctrinal trump on government power. First Amendment values are
not independent constructs; rather, those values are integrated components of
a political system, and as such they can only be defined as they function
within that system.70
Viewed from this functional perspective, the limitation on expenditures is
not so much a limitation on speech as it is a method of insulating the electoral
process from what Congress deemed to be the corrupting influence of
fundraising. It is, in short, a device designed to advance a classically liberal
core value of the First Amendment, namely, the promotion of untainted
political discourse within a competitive system of free expression.
White objected to the Court's doctrinal equation of money with speech.7
For White, the expenditure limitation did not directly regulate political speech,
but a nonspeech element of the campaign process, the spending of money.
Money, according to White, cannot be fairly equated with speech, at least not
in terms of First Amendment values. While money does provide a means for
engaging in speech, it does not follow that the regulation of the monetary
aspect of the campaign process will in fact undermine such discourse.
Congress, therefore, should be free to regulate expenditures so long as there
is a substantial reason for doing so and the impact on political discourse is not
overly burdensome. White thought these standards were satisfied. Congress'
determination that expenditure limitations were necessary to curb the costs of
elections, as well as to allay the perception that elections were being bought,
represented to him a commonsense judgment entitled to judicial respect.
. White accepted another structural consideration, namely, the congressional
determination that contribution and expenditure limitations would roughly
equalize the electoral process, ensuring that no candidate would have
"overpowering advantage by reason of a huge campaign war chest."72 So long
69. Id. at 265.
70. This view of the First Amendment as an integrated component of the political process is evident
as well in Justice White's dissent in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802-22 (1978).
In that case the Court held unconstitutional a state statute that prohibited corporate contributions or
expenditures related to ballot measures that did not materially affect the corporation. The limitation was
deemed a direct restriction of political speech. Justice White's dissent did not view the case as creating a
direct clash between governmental power and a First Amendment limitation on that power. Rather he saw
the First Amendment as an integral part of both sides of the equation--on the one hand, the right of
corporations to engage in speech, and on the other, the right of the state to prevent the state-sanctioned
accumulation of corporate wealth to overwhelm the voices of individuals: "The Court's fundamental error
is its failure to realize that the state regulatory interests in terms of which the alleged curtailment of First
Amendment rights accomplished by the statute must be evaluated are themselves derived from the First
Amendment." Id. at 803-04.
71. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262-63.
72. Id. at 265.
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as the expenditure ceiling was not "plainly too low," White would respect the
practical wisdom of Congress to devise an improved electoral model.73
Justice White's Buckley dissent frames the functional approach in a
positive light.74 Even if one disagrees with White's conclusions, the theme of
his opinion-restoring actual competition to the electoral process-has its own
positive attraction. Yet one can view the First Amendment as a functional
component of a system of government and still arrive at conclusions that may
undermine or even eviscerate the utility and value of free expression within
that system. Of itself, functionalism does not promote a particular substantive
outcome. It does not define or promote particular values; rather, it provides a
tool for examining law from a factual and realistic perspective. Such a fact- or
transaction-based examination of law should help expose the values and policy
judgments that lurk behind legal concepts and judicial decisions. Similarly,
functionalism can be used as a rhetorical device to promote particular values
or policy judgments.75 But in the end the inherent "value" to be found in the
functional approach is the value of understanding how the law operates to
promote or disparage other substantive values within particular factual
contexts. Thus, although the Buckley dissent is persuasive testament for
approaching the First Amendment as a component of an all-encompassing
political system-in part because of the attractiveness of the normative values
White sought to promote-it does not follow that all applications of
functionalism will satisfy any particular normative value of free expression.
Branzburg v. Hayes76 effectively illustrates the nonideological nature of
functionalism. Branzburg involved a reporter's refusal to divulge confidential
sources to a grand jury. Claiming that the information was privileged, the
reporter phrased his First Amendment argument in functional terms: reporters
gather information through confidential sources; these confidential sources
remain available only to the extent they can be assured continued
confidentiality. This system provides reporters with the raw material needed
to write the news which, in turn, is vital to inform the public. In this manner,
the news-gathering system, including the privileged identity of the informant,
advances the public's right to know, a core value of the First Amendment.
Writing for the Court, Justice White did not find this argument persuasive.
The reporter's system was not a separate, dispositive construct that by its own
force could give rise to a constitutional privilege. Rather, for White, the news-
gathering process was one part of a social and governmental landscape that
73. Id. at 265-66.
74. Accord Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
502-18 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
303-11 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
75. The current debate over speech codes is a case in point. Compare Nadine Strossen, Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484 with Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE LJ. 431.
76. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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contained a legitimate law enforcement system which included grand jury
investigations. While the public had an interest in the free flow of information,
the public also had an equally strong claim to an effective system of law
enforcement.77
Again, White examined the historical and contemporary function at issue,
in this case the reporter's privilege and the First Amendment. Historically,
there was no reporter's privilege largely because the grand jury's dual
function-finding probable cause to prosecute and protecting citizens against
unfounded charges-required both a broad investigative authority and the full
participation of all citizens called upon to testify.78 "From the beginning of
our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for press
informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitutional rules have
not been a serious obstacle to either the development or retention of
confidential news sources by the press."79 Even in today's world, White was
not convinced that the absence of a reporter's privilege would encumber the
press' ability to function as a conduit of information to the public. The record
contained no convincing evidence that sources of information would disappear
without the privilege. "Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on
the willingness of informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely
divergent and to a great extent speculative. 80 White also declined to assume
that all, or even most, confidential sources would provide information likely
to be of interest to a grand jury investigation; indeed, the only confidential
sources who might be affected by the lack of privilege were those who had
either committed a crime or had witnessed a crime. The former were entitled
to no special consideration, and the reporter, like all citizens, had an obligation
to testify to crimes witnessed. The argument for a privilege to protect
witnesses to a crime stood on a slightly better footing-it was not
irrational-but the Court found no adequate factual support for the reporter's
contention that such sources would refuse to come forward. And even
assuming some informants would refuse, the public's interest in prosecuting
and deterring crime would take precedence over any such claim.8" In White's
words, "it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to
commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint
of public policy.,'82
Justice White also pointed to other elements within the system that
militated against the creation of a constitutional privilege:
77. Id. at 686-88.
78. Id. at 685-87.
79. Id. at 698-99.
80. Id. at 693-94 (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 695-97.
82. Id. at 696.
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Neither are we now convinced that a virtually impenetrable
constitutional shield, beyond legislative or judicial control, should be
forged to protect a private system of informers operated by the press
to report on criminal conduct, a system that would be unaccountable
to the public, would pose a threat to the citizen's justifiable
expectations of privacy, and would equally protect well-intentioned
informants and those who for pay or otherwise betray their trust to
their employer or associates. s
If such a privilege were to be created it would be better left to the hands of
Congress or the state legislatures. Those entities possess the political authority
and the institutional competence to address this issue.8 Finally, White struck
a decidedly realist theme by observing that the creation of a reporter's
privilege would "obstruct the search for truth., 85 After all, if facts are the
critical foundation for a realistic appraisal of legal controversies, limitations on
the fact-finding process potentially undermine that endeavor.8 6
The significance of White's opinion in Branzburg does not lie in its
rejection of a reporter's privilege, but in the manner in which that privilege
was denied. White dismantled the functional argument in favor of a privilege
in three ways, all of which underscore White's function- and fact-oriented
approach to jurisprudence. First, by refusing to encapsulate the issues within
the relatively narrow confines of the news-gathering perspective, White
transformed the functional argument of the reporter into a functional argument
against the reporter. In essence, White said, "Let's look at this from another
somewhat more comprehensive perspective." Second, taking the reporter's
argument at face value, White attempted to show that its functional depiction
of reality-a system of information gathering and the resulting free flow of
information-was inaccurate. The facts did not sustain the claim. Finally,
extending the argument from function to policy, White asserted that no sound
policy reason supported the judiciary's creation of a privilege that would
interfere with the fact-intensive process of investigating crime. These
themes-function, fact, and policy-are at the very heart of White's
jurisprudence.
The application of this methodology, however, does not lead to obvious
or ideologically consistent results. Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg, also
premised upon functionalism, offers a strong counterpoint to Justice White's
opinion.87 In the beginning of his dissent, Stewart passionately endorsed the
vital role played by the press in a free and democratic society. He stated that
the right to publish, and the corollary right to gather news, are absolutely
83. Id. at 697.
84. Id. at 706.
85. Id. at 690 n.29.
86. See FRANK, supra note 4, at 14-16.
87. 408 U.S. at 725-52 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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essential to the survival of our social and political system.88 Furthermore, he
argued, the right to gather news necessarily includes "a right to a confidential
relationship between a reporter and his source," since an "unbridled subpoena
power" would undermine the reporter's ability or willingness to gather or
publish information. 89 Stewart reinforced this commonsense judgment about
the effect of broad subpoena power with what he described as "concrete
evidence," citing numerous studies supporting his view.9" Although
individually these studies did not, and probably could not, offer scientific
precision, taken together they were sufficiently probative to indicate that the
absolute lack of a reporter's privilege would, in fact, restrict the flow of
information to the public. Balancing society's interest in law enforcement
against society's interest in the free flow of information, Stewart concluded
that some type of judicially created privilege was necessary. 91
There are three critical distinctions between the White and Stewart
opinions in Branzburg. First, the interpretation of the facts varied between
White's view that the lack of a privilege would have little effect on the flow
of information to the public and Stewart's contrary conclusion that the impact
would be great. Both conclusions are necessarily based on broad speculations
going well beyond the actual facts of the case before the Court, making it
virtually impossible to determine which is correct. Although reliance on
empirical proof is within the realist tradition, the empirical proof available to
the Court was far from dispositive. Second, White's opinion emphasized the
critical role of the grand jury, while Stewart's opinion emphasized the critical
role of the First Amendment. Which function should be given dominant
constitutional consideration depends upon a policy judgment made by the
judge. Functionalism provides no normative measure to determine which policy
judgment is more correct. The value is imparted by the judge. Finally, given
the broad ramifications of a reporter's privilege, White saw the legislative
branch as the appropriate vehicle for the creation of such a privilege, while
Stewart saw the judiciary as responsible for making that policy judgment.
Again, although functionalism recognizes that the judiciary will make policy
decisions, functionalism provides only perspectives from which to argue the
propriety or impropriety of such action.
But the nonideological nature of functionalism does not make it
illegitimate. On the contrary, properly executed, the functional approach
exposes the premises upon which a decision rests and provides a thorough
basis for evaluating the decision. The doctrine or policy that underlies a
judicial opinion is dispositive only to the extent that the opinion demonstrates
a nexus between that policy and the particular context and configuration of the
88. Id. at 726-27.
89. Id. at 728.
90. Id. at 732-33 & nn.12-16.
91. Id. at 736-43.
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dispute at hand. Indeed, perhaps one of the most dissatisfying aspects of both
White's and Stewart's opinions is that both rely on factual generalizations and
idiosyncratic applications of common sense. As such, neither opinion emerges
as clearly "right" on the wisdom or necessity of creating a reporter's privilege.
However, the lack of conclusive facts about the impact of grand jury
subpoenas upon the flow of information and the converse impact of a
reporter's privilege upon the grand jury process may lean in favor of White's
deference to the legislative process. This deference to legislative competence
is reminiscent of White's administrative law decisions and lies at the heart of
legal realism: the institutional capacity of the judiciary to discover facts beyond
those of an immediate case or controversy is inadequate for making broad
policy judgments that necessarily rely upon a more inclusive fact-finding
process.
In The Pentagon Papers Case,92 White again relied on the integration of
free expression and governmental structure in his concurring opinion. Indeed,
from White's perspective, one could just as easily categorize Pentagon Papers
as a separation-of-powers case. Pentagon Papers involved a lower court's
injunction against the New York Times' publication of secret government
documents. The Court held that the injunction was improper, and White
agreed. White based his conclusion on the heavy presumption against prior
restraints, a presumption he deemed inherent in the First Amendment, and
upon concerns regarding the vast, virtually unchecked power of the executive
in the realm of national defense.93 Again we see limitation and structure
fusing into a functional whole. In essence, the presumption against prior
restraints, which allowed the newspaper to publish, operated as a check upon
the exercise of executive power in this otherwise unchecked domain.94
Therefore, despite his view that the publication would damage the public
interest, White refused to permit the executive to eviscerate the sole functional
method of constitutional oversight.
As should be evident, White's reasoning goes beyond simple obeisance to
an abstract concept of the First Amendment. White was not entranced by the
freedom of the press; rather he was searching for a functional means to keep
the tripartite system in balance. For example, had Congress required a joint
judgment of all three branches to impose injunctions against publishing
national security information, White hinted that he might have permitted a
prior restraint.95 Such a scenario would lessen if not eliminate any concerns
regarding the exercise of arbitrary power, thereby reducing the need for the
92. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
93. Id. at 730-32 (white, J., concurring).
94. This theme is more explicit in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, which Justice white joined.
Id. at 727-28.
95. Id. at 731 (white, J., concurring) (stating that "express and appropriately limited congressional
authorization," a prior restraint may be permissible).
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press, via the First Amendment, to act as a check. Similarly, White
distinguished between the judicial reluctance to sanction prior restraints and a
judicial willingness to permit criminal prosecutions once the papers are
published.96 Not only are the criminal sanctions authorized by Congress, but
the dissemination of the information places the controversy before the public
and under judicial scrutiny, and permits the establishment of relatively clear
guidelines for future actions. Again, given joint action by the three branches,
as well as public scrutiny, the need for an absolutely unrestrained press is less
evident.
The distinction between prior restraints and criminal prosecutions also
places some responsibility in the lap of the checking institution-the press.
Under a system in which prior restraints are disfavored, the press and not the
President will exercise the judgment on whether to publish, subject of course
to the threat of subsequent criminal prosecution-a check on the press
maintained by the executive. Thus while the executive cannot prevent
publication of embarrassing materials, it may prosecute the publication of
secret materials when that publication is both damaging to the national interest
in a manner specified by Congress and in a manner the executive deems
consistent with judicial and public judgment regarding the need for secrecy in
the context of national security.
Of course, this functionalist approach may cause no little consternation for
the press. The foreboding tone of Justice White's opinion was surely not lost
on those charged with the decision of which of the Pentagon Papers to publish.
From the perspective of the press, the absolute limitation approach advocated
by Justice Black in his Pentagon Papers concurrence97 was surely preferable
to the more risky and complicated scenario suggested by Justice White." Yet
under Black's model the press remains completely unaccountable for its
actions, a proposition that Justice White was unwilling to accept. Indeed, in
several contexts, Justice White clarified his view that despite the large realm
of freedom enjoyed by the press, that freedom does not include the unchecked
authority to act irresponsibly.99 His opinion in Branzburg was, of course,
premised on this same conception of freedom and responsibility.
The foregoing discussion focused on Justice White's use of an integrated,
functional approach to the assessment of controversies implicating the freedom
of expression; White used the same approach in the realm of separation of
powers. These opinions demonstrate that the distinction between structure and
96. Id. at 733-40.
97. Id. at 714-20.
98. Id. at 730-40 (White, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, 542-53 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) ("While
I would not want to live in a society where freedom of the press was unduly limited, I also find regrettable
an interpretation of the First Amendment that fosters such a degree of irresponsibility on the part of the
news media."); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369-404
(1974) (White, J., dissenting).
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limitations is merely for doctrinal convenience and does not accurately portray
reality. White's use of functionalism was something more than a neutral
deconstruction of doctrinal lines, however. Functionalism necessarily carries
a value judgment regarding the nature of law; that is, the functionalist sees law
as a reflection of power relationships arising in factual contexts rather than as
a set of immutable rules to be discovered through judicial introspection.
White's use of functionalism exposed those specific values he deemed worthy
of promotion within that system of power relationships. Thus White's dissents
in the election financing cases reveal his belief that in elections the quality of
public discourse has greater constitutional value than the individual's freedom
to spend one's money as one wishes. Similarly, the Branzburg opinion places
a premium on protecting the fact-discovery process of the criminal justice
system, based on the policy judgment that the needs of that system outweigh
a reporter's need to protect confidential sources. The Pentagon Papers
concurrence values pragmatic workability and individual responsibility over
broad conceptions of absolute power or absolute freedom. Obviously, whether
one accepts or rejects White's value judgments will influence any normative
evaluation of White's jurisprudence. Together, his value judgments form a
conception of our political system. More importantly, however, this section of
the Essay demonstrates that the judicial function necessarily involves the
promotion of value judgments both about what law is and what law ought to
do.
White's freedom-of-expression and separation-of-powers decisions are
similar in that they use a functionalist methodology. They differ, however, in
the values they promote. White's administrative law opinions validate
centralized planning and support the significant restructuring of government
necessary to allow such centralization. In supporting centralized, collective
choice, White places a lower priority on individual freedom, the central value
of liberal philosophy. In contrast, White's First Amendment decisions promote
the liberal values of individual freedom and personal responsibility within a
competitive market system. Government is permitted to regulate, but that
regulation is designed to ensure that the market remains free, competitive, and
responsible, a type of regulation resting upon decidedly liberal premises and
quite consistent with the liberal rule of law.'t° Thus the consistency of
analytical approach-functionalism-belies a divergence of concepts.
V. LIBERAL VALUES AND THE POLICY OF DESEGREGATION
When Justice White began his tenure on the Court in April 1962, Brown
v. Board of Education'01 was just short of its eighth anniversary, yet the "all
100. See HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 61, at 36-42.
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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deliberate speed" command of Brown 11102 still faced formidable resistance
throughout the nation. As the Deputy Attorney General during a volatile period
of the civil rights movement, 3 White was fully aware of that resistance; as
a member of the Court, his opinions and votes moved toward implementing the
Brown mandate. White strongly endorsed the desegregation promise because
he believed that the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
secure the civil rights of black citizens. His observations and experiences as
Deputy Attorney General undoubtedly bolstered the strength of that conviction.
By 1971, Justice White had joined several opinions either striking down
various devices and schemes designed to avoid the constitutional duty to
desegregate' °4 or gianting lower courts ample authority, and even imposing
the duty, to implement effective, immediate, and broad-based remedies
designed for dismantling segregated school systems.'t 5 Justice White's first
written opinion on desegregation came not in a school case, however, but in
Palmer v. Thompson,I°6 a case involving the closure of public swimming
pools by the city of Jackson, Mississippi. Both the strong tone of White's
language and his fact-intensive assessment of the case provide a clear portrait
of his judicial disposition in the realm of civil rights.
Jackson operated its swimming pools on a segregated basis in flagrant
violation of post-Brown decisions requiring desegregation of such public
facilities.'0 7 In 1962, a lawsuit challenged this practice and resulted in a
judgment ordering the city to desegregate its recreational facilities, including
its pools. Instead of opening the pools to both races, however, the city closed
all public pools, professing a belief that integrated pools could not be operated
on a safe and economic basis. The Supreme Court found no constitutional
violation in the closure of the pools. The closure itself was racially neutral and,
therefore, consistent with the equal protection guarantee; moreover, the Court
deemed the consideration of any alleged illicit motive on behalf of the city as
beyond the Court's competence.'0 8 Justice White dissented. 09
102. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
103. Eyes on the Prize, Part I (PBS television broadcast, 1987) (documenting White's involvement
in civil rights controversies as Deputy Attorney General).
104. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (holding that free-transfer plan does not
satisfy duty to desegregate); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) (holding that freedom-of-choice
plan does not satisfy duty to desegregate); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (same); Griffin
v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that closure of public schools and system of grants for
white students to attend private segregated schools perpetuates unlawful segregation); Goss v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (holding that free-transfer plan violates equal protection guarantee of Fourteenth
Amendment).
105. Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. Board ofEduc., 397 U.S. 232 (1970); Alexander v. Holmes County
Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
106. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
107. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (city buses); Holmes v. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf course); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877
(1955) (per curiam) (public beaches and bathhouses).
108. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-26.
[Vol. 103: 419
Byron White
Whereas the majority opinion adopted a formal approach to the
constitutional issues-since the pool closing was, on its face, race-neutral the
equal protection guarantee was not implicated-Justice White's dissent looked
to the factual realities of the event. His dissent is fact-intensive and value-
laden. It describes the post-Brown history of judicial efforts to desegregate
public facilities as well as the parallel history of resistance to those efforts.
Relying on record facts, it depicts the City of Jackson as essentially a
paradigm of that resistance.110 Looking beyond the facial neutrality of the
city's action, White saw both the illicit motive, which he deemed
constitutionally significant, and the "reality" of the disproportionate impact
upon the minority community, including the implicit message to that
community concerning the cost of attempting to enforce constitutional
rights."' The facts led White to conclude that the decision to close the pools
was precipitated by the order to desegregate; indeed, the decision was nothing
more than a means to avoid compliance with a lawful court order and, in the
process, to denigrate the race for whom the Fourteenth Amendment had been
adopted." 2 White also rejected, as unsupported by anything other than gross
speculation, the city's assertion that the pools could not be safely or
economically operated on an integrated basis. Taking all these facts together,
White concluded that the closure of the pools violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In his words, "a State may not have an official stance against
desegregating public facilities and implement it by closing those facilities in
response to a desegregation order."'
13
With a marked similarity to his assessment of legal rules and principles in
areas previously discussed, White's approach to the law of equal protection did
not elevate the niceties of doctrine over the realities of circumstance. If the
Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect the civil rights of blacks-a
value that White clearly deemed of utmost importance-then the Equal
Protection Clause must be interpreted to provide that protection in practice.
Just as the key to understanding the separation of powers is an awareness of
how the government actually functions, the key to understanding the Equal
Protection Clause is an appreciation of the actual dynamics perpetuating
violations of civil rights. In short, the law, particularly constitutional law, must
be construed in a manner that reflects, as nearly as possible, an accurate
appraisal of reality. In Palmer, White interpreted the closure of the pools as
an intentional denigration of the black community; that being the case, neither
deference to the judgment of city officials nor reliance upon nice distinctions
109. Id. at 240-71 (White, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 243-54.
111. Id. at 261-70.
112. Id. at 266-67.
113. Id. at 240.
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of doctrine could alter his perception that the city's conduct violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
Justice White again exhibited his realistic appraisal and doctrinal flexibility
in Milliken v. Bradley.14 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that a
district court could not order a multidistrict remedy for school desegregation
in the absence of a showing that the violations of equal protection actually
crossed district lines, in this case throughout the Detroit metropolitan area." 5
In dissent, White rejected the formal distinction between state-created districts
and noted that, in any event, the equal protection violation belonged to the
state." 6 The following quotation captures the essence of his dissent:
Despite the fact that a metropolitan remedy, if the findings of the
District Court accepted by the Court of Appeals are to be credited,
would more effectively desegregate the Detroit schools, would prevent
resegregation, and would be easier and more feasible from many
standpoints, the Court fashions out of whole cloth an arbitrary rule
that remedies for constitutional violations occurring in a single
Michigan school district must stop at the school district line.
Apparently, no matter how much less burdensome or more effective
and efficient in many respects, such as transportation, the metropolitan
plan might be, the school district line may not be crossed. Otherwise,
it seems, there would be too much disruption of the Michigan scheme
for managing its educational system, too much confusion, and too
much administrative burden.
The District Court, on the scene and familiar with local
conditions, had a wholly different view."7
In short, judicially created remedies, like the underlying constitutional
violations, ought to fairly and accurately address the actual circumstances
presented by the controversy, rather than rely upon some artificial demarcation
created by the state and given judicial blessing in the service of doctrine.
Five years later, Justice White wrote majority opinions in two cases
involving claims of systemwide segregation in urban school districts. In
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick"8 and Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman,"9 the Court affirmed the lower courts' findings that the school
boards had taken action to segregate students on the basis of race, and upheld
the imposition of broad remedial measures. State law did not mandate
segregation and no smoking gun of illicit intent was evident. White's opinions,
however, permitted the lower courts to infer such intent based in part upon the
114. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
115. Id. at 744-45.
116. Id. at 763 (Vhite, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 767-68 (footnote omitted).
118. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
119. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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foreseeable effects of the school boards' actions. In so doing, White satisfied
the Court's holding in Washington v. Davis,20 which he authored, that
required a showing of purposeful discrimination as an essential element of an
equal protection violation. White was quite willing to discover that intent
through a flexible appraisal of the circumstances. Again, reality, as opposed to
formal doctrine, was the controlling principle.
Recently, in Missouri v. Jenkins,121 Justice White again demonstrated his
willingness to confer broad discretion upon district courts. In that case, the
district court entered a school desegregation order that included the imposition
of a substantial property tax increase. The court order included the tax increase
because state law precluded local officials from imposing the type of tax
thought necessary to finance the desegregation plan. The desegregation plan
was both innovative and expensive. The state was not simply required to
reassign students among its existing schools; rather, the plan required the
creation of magnet schools that would attract a racially diverse student
body.22 Under the plan, eighteen existing school facilities would be closed
afid seventeen new facilities would be created throughout the district. The new
facilities included a twenty-five acre farm and a twenty-five acre wildland
area."a The total cost would be $260,000,000.
Writing for the Court, Justice White found that the judicially imposed tax
increase violated principles of comity and was, accordingly, an abuse of
discretion.'24 The Court's opinion went on to hold, however, that the district
court could order the local officials to raise taxes and then enjoin enforcement
of the state laws that limited local authorities from doing so. In so holding, the
Court rejected the state's argument that a court could only order local officials
to impose taxes in a manner consistent with state law. White explained that
state law could not stand as an impediment to the duty to comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 5 Thus while the Milliken Court limited available
desegregation remedies by relying on distinctions created by state law, the
Jenkins Court refused to be bound by such distinctions, and adopted an
approach much closer to that advocated by Justice White in his Milliken
dissent. Moreover, Jenkins indirectly confirmed that district courts are not
120. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). White's adherence to the intent requirement was based largely on his view
that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and supporting civil rights legislation was to remedy state
laws and state action specifically designed to harm black Americans. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S.
100, 129-35 (1981) (White, J., concurring). The holding in Washington v. Davis could be characterized as
imposing a doctrinal straitjacket on resolving problems of racial discrimination; however, given the realism
with which Justice White applied the purposeful discrimination standard, such a characterization seems
inaccurate. See his majority opinion in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). See also City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 94-103 (1980) (,Vhite, J., dissenting).
121. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
122. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1988).
123. Id. at 1301, 1306.
124. 495 U.S. at 50-52.
125. Id. at 57.
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bound by preconceived notions of how to dismantle a segregated school
system. The district court's creative plan suggests that the best solutions will
be discovered not through rules imposed by the Supreme Court, but through
the decentralized and innovative judgment of district courts, a judgment
informed by an intimate knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Justice White's desegregation decisions testify to his conviction that the
Brown mandate, which he interpreted to require the dismantling of all systems
of de jure segregation, must be fully and effectively honored. 26 At the heart
of this commitment to desegregation was White's belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to protect the civil rights of black Americans against
invidious and discriminatory state action. He applied that principle in a fashion
that went beyond formalism and attacked what he perceived to be the practical
realities of race discrimination. The power of federal courts in this specific
regard was as broad as was necessary to remedy the underlying violation. That
power was not totally centered on the Supreme Court; rather, district courts'
had broad discretion which was checked by a deferential Supreme Court
review. In sum, led by Justice White, the Court created a functional system
much like the one White envisioned in the context of the separation of powers.
There is, however, an important distinction. In the context of separation
of powers (and administrative law), the underlying value is a belief in activist
government. Of course, that same belief is seen in White's willingness to grant
district court judges broad discretion in fashioning desegregation remedies. But
the value behind that latter grant of discretion is not simply a general
approbation of governmental activism, but an endorsement of activism in a
specified context, a context driven by more precise values, namely, the full
participation of all citizens in the social, economic, and political process. In
short, much like Justice White's approach to freedom of expression, his
approach to equal protection is premised on maximizing individual freedom
within the political and economic marketplace. The federal judiciary's remedial
power is a means to that end.
126. White's vision of the Fourteenth Amendment did not endorse judicial action beyond the
dismantling of de jure systems of segregation. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (White joins
Court opinion permitting district court to relinquish supervision and control of school district in incremental
stages before full compliance has been achieved in all areas of school operations); Board of Educ. v.
Dowell, Ill S. Ct. 630 (1991) (White joins Court opinion holding that district court may dissolve
desegregation decree if vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to extent practicable); Crawford
v. Board of Edue., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (White joins Court opinion upholding state constitutional provision
that does not permit forced busing other than to remedy violations of Fourteenth Amendment); Pasadena
Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (White joins Court opinion holding that district court
exceeded its authority by ordering school district that had achieved unitary system to readjust attendance
zones based on shifting populations). Cf. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)
(White joins Court opinion striking down state measure that used racial nature of issue-desegregative
busing-to define governmental decisionmaking structure).
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VI. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE AGENDA OF A MODERN
GOVERNMENT
A slightly different picture emerges in the context of nontextual
fundamental rights. Because White generally favored legislative solutions and
judicial nonintervention, as demonstrated in his separation-of-powers and
administrative law decisions, he usually avoided the judicial creation of
protected interests. 127 Under what he deemed appropriate circumstances,
however, Justice White was willing to extend the scope of constitutional
protection. For example, he joined the Court's opinion in Reynolds v. Sims'28
extending the equal protection clause to cover the one-person, one-vote
principle, and he adhered to that principle throughout his career.'2 9 He stated
his reasons for so doing succinctly and in classic liberal terms in Board of
Estimate v. Morris:30
These cases are based on the propositions that in this country the
people govern themselves through their elected representatives and
that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political processes" of the legislative
bodies of the Nation, State, or locality as the case may be.13 '
Overall, however, White recognized that the judicial extension of constitutional
law would interfere with the preferable legislative or administrative solutions
to problems of social policy. Even in the one-person, one-vote context, White
expressed concern that a mathematically rigid application of the doctrine would
promote unnecessary interference with legitimate legislative judgment.'
127. But compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685-89 (1962) (White, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Court for broad construction of cruel and unusual punishment clause in context of narcotics use)
with Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683-700 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court for narrow
construction of cruel and unusual punishment clause in context of student corporal punishment).
128. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
129. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (White, J.) (enforcing one-person, one-vote
rule); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,765-83 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's equality
requirement as more precise than statistical inaccuracy of census count); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 374-
89 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's one-acre, one-vote rule); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S.
783 (1973) (white, J.) (applying relatively rigid one-person, one-vote standard to congressional districts);
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (White, J.) (adopting more flexible standard for state legislative
districts than for congressional districts); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (White, J.) (holding
that minor deviations do not make out prima facie violation of equal protection); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S.
108 (1971) Ovhite, J.) (affirming district court invalidation of apportionment plan); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,
399 U.S. 204 (1970) (White, J.) (finding vote on general obligation bonds may not be limited to owners
of real property); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 553-56 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting to
Court's mathematically inflexible standards); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (White, J.)
(extending Reynolds to local governmental units); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967) (White, J.)
(applying Reynolds to nonminor variations in voting disparities).
130. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
131. Id. at 693 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)).
132. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 765-83 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U.S. 542, 553-56 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
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These general observations, however, merely describe a broad landscape; they
require specific exploration.'33
The right of privacy is, for the present generation, the quintessential
nontextual right, including within its amorphous contours the good, the bad,
and the ugly of judicial review. It is both the destroyer of judicial careers and
the altar upon which such careers are sanctified. Depending on one's
perspective, constitutional privacy represents either the evil reincarnation of
Lochner and substantive due process or the wise and judicious extension of
constitutional principles to a realm of activity that ought to be free from
governmental interference. Of course, it's more complicated than that. Justice
White's opinions reflect much of the internal tension found within the
jurisprudence of privacy. A fruitful place to begin an examination of Justice
White's response to the right of privacy is Griswold v. Connecticut,3 a case
involving a challenge to Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute.
The six opinions in Griswold underscore both the richness and the
evanescence of constitutional law. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court offers
his well known and somewhat loopy tour deforce of penumbras and invisible
emanations from which he conjured an amorphous, but potent right of
privacy.135 Justice Goldberg presented a theory of an enforceable Ninth
Amendment,1 36 while Justice Harlan argued that privacy is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. 37 Justice Black submitted a powerful dissent
based upon the absence of a specific textual guarantee of privacy, 33 and
Justice Stewart roundly criticized the reasoning in the Douglas and Goldberg
opinions. 39 Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. 40
Justice White agreed that the anti-contraceptive statute at issue in Griswold
infringed upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest, one that he broadly
defined as involving the intimacies of the marriage relationship. His treatment
of the issue was cryptic: "It would be unduly repetitious, and belaboring the
obvious, to expound on the impact of this statute on the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary or capricious denials or on the
nature of this liberty.'.' Since, in White's view, the statute invaded the
marital relationship in a significant way, the state bore "a substantial burden
133. White was also willing to put some teeth in the rational basis test. See, e.g., City of Clebume v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (White, J.); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
597-611 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63-70
(1973) (White, J., dissenting).
134. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
135. Id. at 480-86.
136. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 507-27.
139. Id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 502-07.
141. Id. at 502.
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of justification" for the interference.'42 Although White referred to the strict
scrutiny test, his analysis seems more like an application of a slightly
invigorated rational basis test: "But such statutes, if reasonably necessary for
the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest, and not arbitrary
or capricious in application, are not invalid under the Due Process
Clause.'
143
The Connecticut statute failed to meet that standard. The goal of the law
was said to be the prevention of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, a
goal that White saw as "permissible and legitimate."' 44 But the means
chosen-a ban on married couples' use of contraceptives-did not "in any way
reinforce[] the State's ban on illicit sexual relationships.' 45 White saw no
significant relationship between the prevention of illicit sex and the state's
imposition on married couples. 146 Iypical of that discussion is the following
observation:
Perhaps the theory is that the flat ban on use prevents married people
from possessing contraceptives and without the ready availability of
such devices for use in the marital relationship, there will be no or
less temptation to use them in extramarital ones. This reasoning rests
on the premise that married people will comply with the ban in regard
to their marital relationship, notwithstanding total nonenforcement in
this context and apparent nonenforcibility, but will not comply with
criminal statutes prohibiting extramarital affairs and the anti-use
statute in respect to illicit sexual relationships, a premise whose
validity has not been demonstrated and whose intrinsic validity is not
very evident.'47
In short, the statute did not provide a rational method for advancing the state's
legitimate goals. This conclusion did not require a novel theory of penumbras
and invisible emanations; it did not require a resolution of the debate between
Justices Goldberg and Black regarding the scope of the Ninth Amendment; and
it did not require an elaboration of the concept of ordered liberty. For White,
it was enough to recognize that the marital relationship was part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause and that the state had regulated that
relationship without sufficient justification.'48
There is something attractive in Justice White's seemingly simple solution
to the question presented in Griswold. If Connecticut's ban on contraceptives
142. Id. at 502-03.
143. 1& at 504.
144. Id. at 505.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 505-07.
147. Id.
148. White applied this same type of rationality analysis in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
a case in which the Court struck down a Massachusetts law that permitted only married persons to obtain
contraceptives, and then only with a physician's approval. Id. at 460-65 ('White, J., concurring).
1993]
The Yale Law Journal
was demonstrably irrational, there was no need to resolve the more
complicated constitutional issues debated in the various concurrences and
dissents. Yet an undue reliance on ends/means rationality can operate as an
analytical trap. Specifically, rationality review may seriously undervalue the
principles in conflict and lead subsequent decisionmakers to assume that the
necessary is also the sufficient. For example, in Griswold had the state
rationally explained its complete ban on the use of contraceptives, under
ends/means rationality the requisite judicial scrutiny would have run its course.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that a state should be free to regulate
private conduct based upon nothing more than a standard of rationality. Any
imposition of state authority to regulate private moral choice raises issues that
go to the very heart of the concepts of limited government and liberal
democracy. If one premise of such a political system is that the government
may regulate private conduct only under narrow, specified circumstances, then
something more than ends/means rationality is required to justify a law that
intrudes upon the private sphere. It may well be that the Ninth Amendment
was meant to embody this supposition of liberal democracy, a supposition that
necessarily rejects rationality as a sufficient basis for law. Moreover, despite
doctrines of judicial restraint, Griswold provided an opportunity for the Court
to sort through, at least as a preliminary matter, these challenging constitutional
issues. White's opinion, however, provides only minimal guidance for future
applications.
The tension between rationality and the imposition of moral choice is
further exposed in Roe v. Wade.149 That Justice White dissented in Roe is
well known. In six spare paragraphs, his terse opinion attacked the moral and
constitutional foundations of the majority opinion. 50 From White's
perspective, the Court elevated convenience over human life; it exercised raw
power in an improvident and extravagant fashion; and, more generally, it failed
to proceed in a reasonable fashion and in a manner consistent with
constitutional structure.'15 For Justice White, the sweeping decision in
Roe-the seeds of which were barely discernible in Griswold-presents a stark
and injudicious confrontation with his belief in the integral importance of
careful, reasoned judgment. In his words,
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support
the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a
new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any
reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient
substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot
is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are
149. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
150. Id. at 221-23 (white, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
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constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the
continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand,
against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other
hand. As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has
authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an
improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review
that the Constitution extends to this Court." 2
Justice White never acquiesced in the Court's jurisprudence of
abortion,"5 3 and in a dissenting opinion in Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists54 he called upon the Court to overrule
Roe. In Thornburgh, he explained that although he had no doubt that a
woman's ability to choose an abortion came within the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause, he did not agree that this liberty interest was fundamental
enough to be entitled to anything more than the scrutiny provided by the
rational basis test.
Fundamental liberties and interests are most clearly present when
the Constitution provides specific textual recognition of their existence
and importance. Thus, the Court is on relatively firm ground when it
deems certain of the liberties set forth in the Bill of Rights to be
fundamental and therefore finds them incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that no State may deprive any person of
liberty without due process of law. When the Court ventures further
and defines as "fundamental" liberties that are nowhere mentioned in
the Constitution (or that are present only in the so-called "penumbras"
of specifically enumerated rights), it must, of necessity, act with more
caution, lest it open itself to the accusation that, in the name of
identifying constitutional principles to which the people have
consented in framing their Constitution, the Court has done nothing
more than impose its own controversial choices of value upon the
people.'
White then described two approaches that have informed the judicial search for
nontextual fundamental rights: rights "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" and rights that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."'156 Neither test provides a mechanical yardstick; rather, "[t]heir
utility lies in their effort to identify some source of constitutional value that
reflects not the philosophical predilections of individual judges, but basic
choices made by the people themselves in constituting their system of
152. Id. at 222.
153. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 327-29 (1980) (White, J., concurring); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 656-57 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92-101 (1976)
(White, J., concurring and dissenting).
154. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
155. l at 790.
156. Id. at 790-91.
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government . . . .""' White also recognized the role of precedent in
providing a foundation for the discovery and expansion of such rights. He then
ended this section of the opinion with an explanation of why abortion rights
are neither implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, deeply rooted in our
history or tradition, nor supported by precedent.
Given the nonfundamental nature of abortion rights, the regulation of
abortion, according to White, should be left largely to the states.
Abortion is a hotly contested moral and political issue. Such issues,
in our society, are to be resolved by the will of the people, either as
expressed through legislation or through the general principles they
have already incorporated into the Constitution they have adopted.
Roe v. Wade implies that the people have already resolved the debate
by weaving into the Constitution the values and principles that answer
the issue. As I have argued, I believe it is clear that the people have
never... done any such thing. I would return the issue to the people
by overruling Roe v. Wade.1
58
Curiously, White's blunt dissent in Roe is both more powerful and more
sophisticated than his more elaborate and seemingly more polished dissent in
Thornburgh. For example, the assertion that the democratic will of the people
ought to resolve moral issues begs important questions about individual moral
choice and the role of government in coercing particular "moral" choices. That
aside, his overt reliance on doctrine seems so unsatisfying and so
uncharacteristic. In Roe, White explicitly confronted what he perceived to be
the moral and philosophical issues presented by the plaintiff's challenge to the
Texas abortion statute. The question was not whether through doctrinal
passageways one could discover a fundamental right; rather, the question was
whether the circumstances provided an adequate basis for state intervention in
the realm of private choice. If White was correct in thinking that Roe's
argument favored the convenience of the mother over the life of an unborn
child, he could have made a powerful argument that the state would have a
strong interest in protecting the life of that child, just as the state has an
interest in preventing violence to any member of the community.
In other words, the Roe dissent focused on the critical issues. The
Thornburgh dissent, on the other hand, adopted a fairly standard doctrinal
approach that drew an analytical line between structure and liberty and
assumed that resolution of the controversy actually turned on whether a
woman's right to privacy could be fairly characterized as fundamental. As
such, the Thornburgh dissent seems to be more a reflection of the highly
structured, doctrinal style of the Roe opinion (and subsequent abortion
157. Id. at 791.
158. Id. at 796-97 (footnote omitted).
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jurisprudence) than a realistic appraisal of the issues at stake. Such an appraisal
would not necessarily lead to the affirmation of abortion regulations, but it
might lead to a better understanding of the interests involved in the
controversy. It would at least point to the right question: under what
circumstances, if any, should the state, rather than the mother, make decisions
about childbirth. Of course, from a classic liberal perspective, the presumption
is in favor of individual over collective choice.
The same tension between collective and individual choice came to the
fore in Bowers v. Hardwick,59 a case in which the Court affirmed a state's
right to criminalize acts of homosexual sodomy. Writing for the majority,
White stated the issue directly: "The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such
conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time."' 60 From the outset
the facts are critical: both the specific facts of the controversy-homosexual
sodomy-and the broader, historical facts involving the traditional regulation
of such conduct. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, saw the issue in more
conceptual terms: "IT]his case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let
alone. ' "16' These words appear to be no more than a platitude, but ironically,
Justice Blackmun's conceptual approach may have brought him closer to the
heart of the case than did Justice White's more fact-bound description.
Justice White's analysis in Bowers parallels his dissent in Thornburgh.
According to White, the right to engage in sodomy was not "'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist
if [it] were sacrificed."' 62 Nor was such a right "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.' 163 Beyond that, White was unwilling to
further develop the law of fundamental rights in this specific context. In so
refusing, he referred to the "face-off' between the judiciary and "the
Executive" in the 1930's "which resulted in the repudiation of much of the
substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the Due Process Clauses,"'
64
and observed:
There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive
reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the
category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country
159. 478 O.S. 186 (1986).
160. Id. at 190.
161. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
162. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
163. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
164. Id. at 194-95.
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without express constitutional authority. The claimed right pressed on
us today falls far short of overcoming this resistance."
The contrast between White's ready acceptance of the sexual rights of
married couples as fundamental in Griswold and his equally ready refusal to
so categorize the sexual activities of homosexuals is evident. Of course, the
traditional and historical recognition of marriage may provide an ample basis
for distinguishing these categories of rights. Similarly, the historical regulation
of abortions may distinguish the right to procure an abortion from other rights
relating to procreation and childbirth. Yet Bowers seems to fall into the same
analytical trap as the Thornburgh dissent. The question is not whether sodomy
(or the right of privacy or the right to be let alone or whatever characterization
you please) is a fundamental right; nor is it whether the Court should resurrect
the substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner era. The question is
whether the collective wisdom of the state should trump the individual's
presumptive freedom of choice. Again, I am not suggesting a particular
answer, only a particular question.
Even if one accepts the wisdom of judicial restraint and even if one
accepts the doctrinal trouncing of Hardwick's claim, something in the Bowers
opinion seems lacking. I have written elsewhere that the decision in Bowers
appears to be as much a repudiation of Roe v. Wade as it is a denial of the
rights of homosexuals. 66 I shall not repeat that argument at length. Suffice
it to say that Justice White's opinion in Bowers assumed that the primary issue
to be resolved is the fundamental rights status of homosexual sodomy. There
was, however, a more basic issue-the potential irrationality of the state's law.
That issue was addressed and resolved in the penultimate paragraph of Justice
White's opinion.
That paragraph is a disappointment. It neither insists upon a rational
justification for the law, nor investigates any other explanation of its origin.
Instead, White told us the ban on homosexual sodomy is based on society's
judgment that such practices are immoral. He did not explore or even describe
the basis of that morality. Can a claim of immorality provide a sufficiently
rational basis for a statute? This question should challenge White, who
generally insisted that law be based on reason. White resolved this challenge
in a single sentence: "The law, however, is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
indeed." 167 Of course, all laws based on moral choice are not necessarily
irrational. Just as the abstraction of morality is not synonymous with the
165. Id. at 195.
166. Allan Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Enigmatic Fifth Vote and the Reasonableness of Moral
Certitude, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (1992).
167. 478 U.S. at 196.
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practice of reason, 168 the practice of morality is not synonymous with
irrationality. However, a bare claim of morality, like an abstruse legal doctrine,
might be nothing more than a linguistic subterfuge to advance personal
predilections or the exercise of arbitrary power. Considering the general pattern
of Justice White's opinions, one would expect his Bowers opinion to have
looked behind the abstract claim of morality to discover the reality behind that
claim. Justice Blackmun's dissent, on the other hand, moved deftly from its
conceptual opening to a discussion of the role morality plays in the imposition
of legal norms. 6 9 White's failure to offer a simple discussion is surprising
in light of his penchant for realistic analysis and his sensitivity to issues of
individual freedom in the context of freedom of expression and equal
protection.
Ironically, Bowers represents a perfect foil for the application of the art of
legal realism. The nagging absence of any discussion of rationality in Bowers
presents a stark contrast with White's other decisions that looked behind the
facade of the law. For if laws regulating human conduct can be justified on a
mere claim of abstract morality, then such laws are truly "hocus-pocus"
enshrining the public enforcement of arbitrary power.
I have puzzled over the obvious tension between White's willing
endorsement of constitutional creativity in the contexts of separation of powers
and desegregation and his disapproval of such creativity in the context of
certain nontextual rights. Several possibilities occur to me. Whereas separation
of powers involves the judicial validation of political judgment, the discovery
of unenumerated rights involves a direct act of judicial creation or discovery,
coupled with the invalidation of political judgment. Thus, White accepts a
model of activist government, relatively uninhibited by strict rules of
constitutional doctrine, regardless of whether those rules are premised upon the
separation of powers or the concept of individual liberty. The demise of
Lochner, to which White refers in Bowers, represents the demise of all strict
limitations, and accordingly ushers in a new era for imposing collective choice
in a vast array of social and economic issues.
This explanation does not, however, account for White's more activist
posture in the realm of desegregation. In that context, judicial
creativity-beginning with Brown-was the essential ingredient of progress,
and the potential invalidation of political judgment was not an obstacle to that
creativity. One could view these decisions as reflecting a process-oriented
jurisprudence, in which desegregation was a tool for restructuring social
institutions and thus for promoting full participation of all citizens in the
political process. This view would be consistent with White's decisions in Roe
and Bowers, because the rights he rejected in those cases are not usually
168. Ides, supra note 166, at 105-07.
169. 478 U.S. at 210-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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viewed in process-oriented terms. What this single-minded focus on political
participation overlooks, however, is that our constitutional system is concerned
not only with maintaining a functioning system of government, but also with
preserving the value of individual choice.
One could also read the desegregation decisions as reflecting a belief that
individuals should have maximum opportunity to exercise choice. Such a
reading is in tension with White's opinions in Thornburgh and Bowers and in
the related contexts of separation of powers and administrative law are
informed by a post-Lochner jurisprudence in which governmental action is
generally imbued with a presumptive validity. Of course, precisely the opposite
presumption arises in the context of laws that discriminate on the basis of race.
It may well be that laws that discriminate on the basis of moral choice ought
to be subject to this same suspicion. The Ninth Amendment, as Justice
Goldberg suggested in his Griswold concurrence, can be interpreted as a
specific reflection of this more dubious attitude toward governmental regulation
of private choices.
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISMS
This Essay began, "The respondent in this case killed a 10-year-old
child."' 70 In that case, as in so many others, the facts were of fundamental
importance to Justice White. Facts were an essential component of White's
jurisprudence; they defined the scope of controversies before the Court as well
as the basic foundation of the law to be applied to those controversies. If one
substitutes "reality" for "facts," the foundation of Justice White's jurisprudence
was realism rooted in the belief that law should reflect a pragmatic appraisal
of the circumstances to which the law is to be applied. His opinions were most
effective when they were premised upon that foundation. However, Justice
White's jurisprudence was not based solely upon pragmatism or rationality. His
approach to law certainly begins with a practical, real-world orientation. And
there is no doubt that he valued the principles and practice of rational
discourse. His understanding of what law is and how law functions parallels
some of the insights of legal realism. But these opening gambits merely set the
stage for the application of more specific values, the foremost of which was
his basic faith in the American system of democracy and in the people who
work within that system.
White's insistence on the broad and effective enforcement of the mandate
of Brown v. Board of Education reflected his positive attitude toward the
American democracy and the individual's place within that democracy. If that
democracy is to be realized effectively, then the social structure, particularly
the educational system, must provide all members of society the opportunity
170. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 429 (1977) (Vhite, J., dissenting).
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to acquire the tools necessary for good citizenship and economic prosperity.
The broad discretion granted district court judges in implementing
desegregation decrees was premised not only on a rule of reason, but also on
a belief that the application of such a rule would promote the underlying value
of racial justice which itself is necessary for the just and effective functioning
of our political system. Similar observations could be made about White's
opinions on voting rights"' and gender discrimination.172 More generally,
in Justice White's jurisprudence, legal realism was a tool to advance the
political and economic equality necessary to his vision of a just and effective
democratic system.
This underlying faith in the political system also emerges in White's
opinions involving campaign financing. His realistic appraisal of the negative
effects of modem financing on political campaigns focused on concerns
generated by an observable breakdown in the election process, an essential
element in the political system in Justice White's view. His judgment regarding
the function of political campaigns colored his interpretation and application
of principles of the First Amendment. The willingness to accommodate
congressional determinations as to the permissible scope of contributions and
expenditures is as much a product of rationality as it is a product of a specific
value judgment regarding the importance of maintaining the integrity of the
electoral system.
Quite obviously, Justice White did not envision the judiciary as the
primary means to implement American democracy. He believed that once the
legitimate opportunity to participate was established, national, state, and local
political institutions should be the primary sources of policymaking.' Two
themes run together here. First, as a realist White recognized that a modem
government faces a vast array of complex social policy issues. Second, as a
progressive Democrat he believed that people, working in good faith through
the process of democratic government, could effect positive change. The
primary judicial role was to guarantee legislative and executive freedom to
make rational policy judgments and to assure that the other branches adhere
to constitutional principles. In this manner, White's willingness to validate
innovation in the context of the separation of powers was not merely based on
171. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986); NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166 (1985); City of Port Arthur
v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 94-103 (1980) (White, J., dissenting); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 143-45 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
172. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (White joins majority
opinion applying midlevel scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (White joins plurality
opinion calling for strict scrutiny in cases of gender discrimination).
173. In addition to cases previously discussed in the text, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (holding that it is province of legislature to determine scope of
exceptions to American rule regarding attorneys fees).
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a judgment that the innovations were reasonable, but also on a belief that a
relatively unrestrained market for such innovation was an affirmative necessity.
The belief that people working through a structure of democratic
government can effect positive change also explains White's reluctance to
impose judicial solutions on other governmental units. He firmly believed that
absent a clear constitutional mandate to the contrary, the best solutions were
achieved through the political process. Again, we see a faith in the process and
in the people working through and within that process. So long as people can
vote intelligently, so long as the process remains relatively open, and so long
as the appropriate agency of government exercises reasoned judgment, the
presumption of legitimacy ought to prevail absent a clear constitutional
mandate to the contrary. Importantly, White's response to Roe v. Wade was not
to suggest an alternative model that would prevent states from permitting
abortions; rather, his response was to return the matter to the states for political
resolution. 74
There are numerous critical perspectives from which to assess Justice
White's jurisprudence. A textualist would view White's opinions as both
alarming and confusing. The text of the Constitution did not, in the reckoning
of Justice White, provide the sole determinant of constitutionality. History,
precedent, and pressing circumstances, along with the text and the vision of the
Framers, all played a part in creating an evolving body of constitutional law.
That is the clear message of his separation-of-powers dissents; it is no less
clear in his constructions of equal protection, freedom of expression, and
fundamental rights. Sometimes the text was dispositive; sometimes it was not.
Even in those circumstances in which the text appeared dispositive, the critical
factor was the function beneath. 75 And although Justice White sometimes
reached results a textualist might applaud, such as his stand against Roe v.
Wade, the avenues through which such results were achieved were anything
but pure textual exegesis. Indeed, White agreed that the text of the Constitution
provided a foundation for the Roe decision; a woman's decision to choose an
abortion was within the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. White
simply disagreed with the Court's application of the text, largely due to
structural considerations involving his vision of the judicial function within the
political system. No, White was not a textualist in any sense other than as one
who perceived the text as a significant factor in the evolution of constitutional
law. Similar comments could be made from the perspectives of original intent,
strict construction, or interpretivism.
A critique of Justice White's jurisprudence from a doctrinal perspective is
somewhat more complicated. Despite the flavor of realism that pervades
174. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785-814
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
175. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 267-86 (1976) (White, J., concurring and dissenting)
(application of appointments clause).
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White's opinions, he was not anti-doctrine. He did not take the cynical view
that doctrine is nothing more than a composite of personal predilections.
Doctrine, in his view, was an essential ingredient in the common-law process,
a process which he admired and practiced; consistent with that admiration,
White objected strongly to the obfuscation of accepted doctrine. 76 Overall,
he approached doctrine as a reflection of past judicial experience and,
therefore, as a guide to the resolution of present controversies. To the extent
that doctrine worked to advance good policy and to comport with realistic
expectations and practices, doctrine ought to be followed. In the election
financing cases, for example, White relied upon the distinction between content
and conduct to expose what White perceived as the false doctrinal equation of
money with speech. Doctrine was not, however, a shield to protect poor policy
judgments or an insurmountable obstacle to the resolution of contemporary
problems. Thus in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,1
77
White called for reconsideration of the actual malice standard established in
New York Times v. Sullivan178 since, in his estimation, the standard placed
a "perverse" policy premium on the publication of falsehoods. 179 Doctrine
was, in short, a functional tool for the measurement of experience and policy,
worthy of respect only insofar as it reflected realistic expectations and
promoted sound policy.
The potential objections to White's willingness to bear witness to the
evolution of constitutional law are self-evident. If the text represents the
specific embodiment of fundamental law created by the people, then the text
is sacrosanct. "No law means no law"' 80 and no judge should be permitted
to proceed on any other assumption. So too, if doctrine represents the judicial
discovery of true constitutional vision, then alterations of doctrine should only
occur when the prior vision was manifestly incorrect. To the extent that the
Constitution is to evolve, that evolution should occur through the process of
constitutional amendment. Measured against these principles, White's
jurisprudence would be characterized as misguided. Despite being constantly
labelled as a judicial conservative, from a pure textualist or a formal doctrinal
perspective, he was a radical.
More generally, without a firm anchor in text or formal doctrine, a
jurisprudence based on realism and reason, even though applied cogently and
176. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2553-55 (1992) (white, J., dissenting)
(rebuking Justice Scalia's descent into doctrinal confusion).
177. 472 U.S. 749, 765-74 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
178. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
179. 472 U.S. at 769 ('The New York limes rule thus countenances two evils: first, the stream of
information about public officials and public affairs is polluted and often remains polluted by false
information; and second, the reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by
falsehoods that might have been avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts.").
180. Edmund Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 549, 553 (1962).
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in good faith, can nonetheless lay the foundation for the slow dissolution of
our constitutional system of government. Incremental adjustments to the
separation-of-powers doctrine may lead to the ultimate centralization of power,
although no particular step in the process trips the wire of unconstitutionality.
Similarly, a careful balancing of interests in the election financing cases that
legitimizes even a slight erosion of First Amendment rights may lay the
groundwork for less-than-careful balancing which infringes those rights to a
much greater extent. Thus despite the attractiveness of a rule of reason, one
does sometimes long for something more definite, along the lines of Justice
Black's admonition that no law means no law. Of course, Justice White did
enforce specific constitutional limitations, but these limitations were
undoubtedly informed by value judgments regarding both the scope and the
continuing vitality of the constitutional norms to be enforced. In general,
however, White's jurisprudence reflected something akin to a constitutional
Darwinism, permitting and validating constitutional change as a necessary part
of the inevitable evolution of our social and political system.
A specific case in point is White's response to the administrative state. Not
only has the administrative state transformed the tripartite model of separation
of powers into a form that includes systems of centralized power that conflate
legislative, executive, and judicial functions; it has placed that power in a body
of supposed experts operating for the benefit of society and relatively isolated
from political accountability. The Supreme Court, with Justice White's
enthusiastic support, has validated this modern model of government. But, as
some commentators have suggested, the validation may be somewhat
premature. 181 It is not entirely clear that our body of experts operates in the
neutral and effective fashion that certain legal theorists predicted. Nor is it
clear that highly centralized bureaucracies function in a manner that is
consistent with the best interests of society. Perhaps the time has come for a
new, fact-intensive, and realistic examination of the administrative state.
These and other potential criticisms bring us back to the basic premise of
Justice White's political and judicial philosophy. In the end, our system of
government depends on the good faith and intelligence of those who live under
it and work within it. Just as the judiciary must defer to the reasonable
judgment of the political branches on the assumption that those branches have
acted intelligently and in good faith, the public must retain its faith in the
operation of the judiciary, not as a bastion of textual or doctrinal formality, but
as a reasonable arbiter of a system of government designed to adapt to
changing circumstances. It was, therefore, for White's generation of jurists to
permit the creation of the administrative state; it is perhaps for the present
generation to question the continuing validity of that experiment.
181. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 50, at 446-52.
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A final approach to evaluating Justice White's jurisprudence might be the
one suggested at the beginning of this Essay; namely, to forgo doctrinal labels
and to examine White's opinions on their own terms. If I am correct that
Justice White was a practitioner of modified legal realism, who possessed a
faith in our democratic system and activist government, then the question is
whether his opinions reflect an intelligent and coherent application of that
combination of realism and faith. I think they do.

